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TARTNERSHIP-DIsCLOsuRE, FAIRNESS AND SUBSTANTIVE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE REGULATION OF A GENERAL PARTNER'S FIDUCIARY DuTy IN A
REAL ESTATE LIMITED PARTNERSmp-Bassan v. Investment Ex-
change Corp., 83 Wn. 2d 922, 524 P.2d 233 (1974); WASH. AD. CODE
§§ 460-32A-010 et seq. (1975).
Plaintiffs were 6 of 35 limited partners in Auburn West Associates,
a Washington limited partnership formed in 1964 by the defendant
and sole general partner, Investment Exchange Corporation, for the
purpose of acquiring real property from the general partner and
others to be improved and held for lease or resale.' Neither the pro-
spectus, the articles of limited partnership, nor the partnership certifi-
cate provided a profit formula for anticipated sales of real estate from
the general partner to the partnership.2
Plaintiffs brought an action for an accounting and dissolution of
the partnership on the theory that the general partner had breached its
fiduciary duty to the limited partnership by acquiring certain real
property after the formation of the partnership and selling it to the
partnership at a substantial profit without the express consent of the
limited partners.3 On appeal from a directed verdict for the defen-
dants, the Washington Supreme Court reversed. Held: A general
partner in a limited partnership is accountable to the partnership as a
1. The Articles of Limited Partnership for Auburn West Associates, Article III,
stated the purpose of the partnership:
To initially acquire, for investment, improve and hold for lease or resale, a
tract of real property. The General Partner presently is the owner of interests in
said real property. To additionally acquire from the General Partner such other
adjacent and contiguous tracts as, in the sole determination of the General Part-
ner, will enhance the partnership properties and objectives.
Brief for Appellants at 6, Bassan v. Investment Exch. Corp., 83 Wn. 2d 922, 524 P.2d
233 (1974).
2. There was no express indication in the prospectus that the general partner
would take a profit upon sale of real estate to the limited partnership. Reference in the
prospectus to Article VIII of the Articles of Limited Partnership, which represented
that the general partner would be reimbursed for costs and expenses incurred in
management of the partnership affairs, "in addition to its respective share of the
profits of the partnership," id. at 6-7, could cause one to conclude that the general
partner would profit from its participation in Auburn West Associates via returns on
the partnership units it held and in that manner alone.
3. Bassan involved the "Murakami" parcel which was acquired subsequent to the
formation of the partnership at a cost of $382,500 to the general partner and then
sold to the partnership for $550,000, resulting in a profit of $167,500 to the general
partner. In addition, a commission of $24,500 was paid by the partnership to the au-
thorized real estate subsidiary of the general partner. 83 Wn. 2d at 924, 524 P.2d at
236; see text accompanying notes 21-28 infra.
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fiduciary and may not derive profits from its dealings with the limited
partnership unless an express formulation of allowable profits is dis-
closed in the articles of limited partnership. In dictum, the court
intimated that it would analyze the fairness of transactions between
general partners and limited partnerships, regardless of disclosed
profit formulas. 4 The three-judge dissent argued that the majority ig-
nored basic rules of contract law by rejecting the contention that the
partnership agreement was modified by the parties' course of dealings.
Bassan v. Investment Exchange Corp., 83 Wn. 2d 922, 524 P.2d 233
(1974).
Bassan is the first case in Washington to be decided under Section 9
of the Washington Uniform Limited Partnership Act (WULPA)5 since
its adoption in this jurisdiction in 1945. The court's decision is unique
not only in its statement that the general partner is precluded from
retaining undisclosed profits in its dealings with and on behalf of the
limited partnership without the express consent of all limited part-
ners, 6 but also in its implication that the court will look beyond the
form of the transaction to examine the substantive fairness of the bar-
4. The court stated that general partner self-dealing is not, ipso facto, impermis-
sible if it is specifically authorized in the partnership agreement. However. the court's
language implies that, in some instances, e.g., exorbitant profits, even authorized self-
dealing will not be permitted. See text following note 40 infra.
5. Section 9 provides in part: "A general partner shall have all the rights and be
subject to all the restrictions and liabilities of a partner in a partnership without
limited partners .... "" WASH. REV. CODE § 25.08.090 (1974); see Homestake Mining
Co. v. Mid-Continent Exploration Co., 282 F.2d 787, 799 (10th Cir. 1960) (applying,
in dictum, the fiduciary duties of a partner in a non-limited partnership to the general
partner of a limited partnership). Washington has basically adopted the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act (ULPA) as promulgated by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The only major divergence is Washington's
addition of Subsections (2) and (3) to § 7. See note 46 infra.
6. In the event the articles of limited partnership have been incorporated into the
partnership certificate, which must be signed by each limited partner, it is accurate to
say that general partner profits must receive the express consent of all limited partners.
WASH. REV. CODE § 25.08.020(1) (1974). There is nothing, however, in the WULPA
which requires the articles to be incorporated in the partnership certificate. There is
generally a "'separate, private limited partnership agreement covering matters [like
profit shares of general partners] not required to be stated in the certificate." J. CRANE
& A. BROMBERG. LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 145 (1968). Whether or not the articles are
incorporated into the certificate, the general partner is well-advised to have each lim-
ited partner sign the articles of partnership as well as the partnership certificate to
assure it has received each limited partner's consent to the provisions outlined in the
articles. This rule is more rigid than the corporate approach which simply requires
consent of the holders of 2/3 of the class of shares entitled to vote on profits taken by a
corporate officer or director on transactions with the corporation. See WASH. REV.
CODE § 23A.24.020 (1974).
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gain to the limited partners. This note will discuss the specific prob-
lems raised in Bassan and analyze the court's disposition of the issues
as presented. Second, the note will examine and evaluate, in the con-
text of the real estate limited partnership, the basis for imposing a
fiduciary duty of disclosure upon a general partner, as well as the na-
ture of the duty. The note concludes that, in order to provide greater
protection to limited partners than that provided by the general rules
of contract law, the court should examine the substantive fairness of
post-formation transactions between the general partner and the lim-
ited partnership, utilizing recently promulgated administrative guide-
lines.7
I. THE COURT'S REASONING IN BASSAN
A. Nature of the Auburn West Associates' Offering
The general partner in Bassan, Investment Exchange Corporation,
was organized as a Washington corporation for the purpose of
forming and managing real estate limited partnerships. Eight persons
comprised the shareholders, officers and directors of the corporation.
In 1964, Investment Exchange drafted Articles of Limited Partner-
ship and prepared and circulated a prospectus for the promotion and
sale of Auburn West Associates' limited partnership units.8 The lim-
ited partnership offering was aimed at a relatively unsophisticated
investor 9 and was originally exempt from Washington's securities reg-
7. WASH. AD. CODE §§ 460-32A-010 et seq. (1975). The revised regulations be-
came effective April 1, 1975. See note 75 infra.
8. Brief for Appellants at 4, Bassan.
9. The Auburn West Associates prospectus provided potential investors very little
information with which to assess the offering. The information pertained primarily to
site location for a proposed shopping center, appraisals of property held by the part-
ner, offering of limited partnership units and capitalization. Advantages to limited
partners were phrased in appealing but extremely general terms, e.g., "4. You have
no managemefit problems and you have no personal liability"; and "6. An early profit
may be realized by the Partners by the anticipated sale of a portion of Auburn West
Associates' parcels of land to users." Prospectus for Auburn West Associates at 4
(on file at Washington Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Prospectus]. Compare the
more sophisticated prospectuses collected in I NOTABLE SYNDICATIONS (S. Roulac ed.
1972), which generally provide a detailed statement of investment objectives and
policies, description of the property, management agreement, assumptions used in
preparation of financial forecasts, projected income and expenses, cash flow projec-
tion, profit (loss) projection, risk factors, interest of the parties and federal tax con-
sequences, among other features.
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istration requirements. 10 It was a combined specific property and
"blind pool," or nonspecified properties, offering.'1 Investors in Au-
burn West Associates were not subject to any suitability standards, as
in the case of large public offerings; 12 they were, however, required to
contribute a minimum of $10,000 per limited partnership unit. ' 3
The investors were never provided an accurate representation of
Investment Exchange's anticipated withdrawal from partnership
funds. At the outset, Investment Exchange held five parcels of land
and agreed to acquire a sixth,14 but neither the articles of limited part-
nership nor the prospectus specifically described any other parcels to
be acquired subsequently by Investment Exchange. Yet, Investment
Exchange was granted discretion in its management of the partnership
interests by the articles of limited partnership.' 5 This broad discretion,
combined with the statutory prohibition of a limited partner's exercise
of "control,"'16 left Investment Exchange free to appropriate substan-
tial profits for itself on sales of real estate to the limited partnership. 17
10. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.320(9) (1974). The offering maintained an exempt
status (20 persons or less) even though there were ultimately 35 limited partners; the
statute provides the offering shall be exempt if offered to not more than 20 persons
"in this state during any period of twelve consecutive months." Id. Limited partners
joined Auburn West Associates from 1964 to 1969. Brief for Appellants at 4, Bassan.
11. See note I supra. A "blind pool" offering is one wherein the general partner
solicits investor money for post-formation acquisition of properties pursuant to stated
investment objectives. See Part IV-E infra.
12. Investor suitability standards should include a minimum annual gross income
and minimum net worth, access to advice from qualified sources and general capacity
to bear the lack of liquidity of the investment. See Part IV-A infra.
13. Brief for Appellants at 4, Bassan.
14. Id. at 8-10.
15. See Article VIII of the Articles of Limited Partnership of Auburn West Asso-
ciates. quoted, id. at 6-7.
16. See Part II-A and notes 51-54 and accompanying text infra.
17. While Auburn West Associates was actively engaged in the real estate business.
Investment Exchange netted $431,750 on sales to the limited partnership of real estate
costing the Investment Exchange $866,500. 83 Wn. 2d at 924-27, 524 P.2d at 236-37.
In addition, Investment Exchange and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Investment Ex-
change Realty, received over $110,000 from the partnership in commissions for sell-
ing partnership units and in real estate commissions on transactions of the partner-
ship. Of the latter amount, $32,500 represented a 5% commission to the general
partner on sales of partnership units, despite the affirmative representation in the
prospectus that "'no commission or other remunerations will be paid or given directly
or indirectly for soliciting any prospective buyer [of partnership units]." Brief for
Appellants at 15, Bassan. One limited partner, Milton Grout, who attended the gen-
eral partner's meetings, was in a position, and perhaps under a duty, to report Invest-
ment Exchange's anticipated profits to the other limited partners before the transaction
closed. The point was not raised in Bassan, probably because of the speed with which
legal action was initiated: Investment Exchange's decision as to the amount of profit
to be taken on the Murakami transaction, see text accompanying notes 21-22 infra,
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B. Profit Skimming-The Abuse of Auburn West Associates
The six limited partners in Bassan originally sought recovery of all
profits which Investment Exchange had taken by reason of its sales of
real estate to the partnership. With respect to the five parcels origi-
nally held by Investment Exchange, the highest profit taken was 58
percent and the lowest 33 percent of its cost. Of the properties ac-
quired subsequent to formation of the partnership, the highest profit
taken was 280 percent and the lowest 92 percent of its cost.' 8An in-
dication of the profits taken by Investment Exchange was found in a
prospectus prepared for the SEC which revealed that from May 1964
through December 1965, the partnership acquired eight parcels of
property from Investment Exchange upon which Investment Ex-
change realized an average 53 percent profit over cost. 19 The limited
partners' action for recovery of the above profits was barred by the
statute of limitations. 20
The final transaction, however, and the one on which Investment
Exchange reaped its greatest profit in dollar amount, was not barred
by the statute of limitations. On October 13, 1969, the Murakami
brothers had sold a parcel to Investment Exchange for $382,500.21
Just 33 days later, on November 15, 1969, Investment Exchange's
shareholders formally ratified the resale of the Murakami parcel to
Auburn West Associates for $550,000, thereby securing a profit of
$167,500 or approximately 44 percent of its cost.22
Investment Exchange sought to legitimize its profit margin by an
independent appraisal made at the time of sale to the partnership,
which set the fair market value of the Murakami parcel at $688,000.
This was in contrast to another independent appraisal, made at the
same time, of $325,000.23 The most important factor, however, was
that the Murakamis were willing to sell, and Investment Exchange
was made on November 15, 1969 and the action was commenced but a few days later
on November 26, 1969. 83 Wn. 2d at 927, 524 P.2d at 237.
18. 83 Wn. 2d at 926-27, 524 P.2d at 237.
19. Id. at 926, 524 P.2d at 237.
20. The three-year statute of limitations for fraud, WASH. REv. CODE § 4.16.080(4)
(1974), was applied despite the fact the partnership agreement was a written contract.
21. The sale document was dated October 13, 1969. Brief for Appellants at 12,
Bassan.
22. 83 Wn. 2d at 927, 524 P.2d at 237.
23. See notes 102-03 and accompanying text infra.
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willing to buy, for $382,500just 33 days earlier.24 The most condemn-
ing feature of the transaction was that Investment Exchange realized its
profit merely by assignment of the earnest money agreement to the
partnership.2 5 The profit created by the fictitious spread was not ex-
pressly authorized in the partnership documents;2 6 nor had the limited
partners, at any time before or after the Murakami transaction, ex-
pressly consented to the profits to Investment Exchange. 27 This undis-
closed self-dealing clearly violated Investment Exchange's fiduciary
duty to the limited partnership.2 8
Upon exposure of the fiduciary's self-dealing, the Bassan court
properly recognized that the general partner, Investment Exchange,
should be denied all personal profit or advantage gained from the
transaction. 29 To effectuate that rule, the court required the establish-
ment of a common fund for the benefit of the limited partnership. 30
This is in accord with the statutory framework of a general partner's
fiduciary obligations in a limited partnership.
C. Statutory Framework
By specifying that a "general partner shall have all the rights and
powers and be subject to all the restrictions and liabilities of a partner
in a partnership without limited partners," Section 9 of the WULPA 3 t
extends the basic fiduciary32 relationship of partners in a nonlimited,
24. In Mason County Overtaxed, Inc. v. Mason County, 62 Wn. 2d 677, 683-84.
384 P.2d 352, 356 (1963), the court defined fair market value as "the amount of
money which a purchaser willing, but not obliged, to buy would pay an owner willing.
but not obligated, to sell ...... See also Ozette Ry. v. Grays Harbor County. 16
Wn. 2d 459, 133 P.2d 983 (1943).
25. Brief for Appellants at 12, Bassan.
26. See note 2 sutpra.
27. 83 Wn. 2d at 927, 524 P.2d at 237.
28. Id. at 928, 524 P.2d at 238.
29. I.
30. li.
31. WASH. REV. CODE § 25.08.090 (1974).
32. The term "fiduciary" is a nebulous label which, standing alone, does not pre-
cisely define the nature of a given relationship. In the context of the limited partner-
ship. "[a] partner is a trustee to the extent that his duties bind him, a cestui que trust
as far as the duties that rest on his copartners." Allen v. Steinberg, 244 Md. 119, 223
A.2d 240. 246 (1966). citing I S. ROWLEY, MODERN LAW OF PARTNERSHIP §§ 341-
42 (lst ed. 1916).
Where limited partnership funds are involved, the general partner holds the funds
in trust to be applied for purposes agreed upon by the limited partners. Thus, in a
case where a corporate general partner diverted limited partnership funds for its own
982
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general partnership 33 to the members of a limited partnership.34 In
Bassan, the court properly recognized the above language as effec-
tively applying to limited partnerships Section 21(1) of the Uniform
Partnership Act,35 which provides in part:
Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and
hold as trustee for it any profits derived by him without the consent of
the other partners from any transaction connected with the formation,
conduct, or liquidation of the partnership or from any use by him of
its property.
A literal construction of Section 21(1) implies the fiduciary rela-
tionship arises during negotiations for the formation of the partner-
ship,3 6 necessitating full and complete disclosure of all features of the
purpose rather than using them to acquire a shopping center as contemplated in the
partnership agreement, the court held:
O.B.A. [general partner], its officers and directors owed N.C.A. [limited part-
nership] a fiduciary duty in dealing with the partnership funds remitted to
O.B.A. by First Jersey, without knowledge on the part of the public investors
in N.C.A ..... The evidence sustains the conclusion that O.B.A. was the promo-
ter of N.C.A. and as a consequence thereof assumed a fiduciary duty in its deal-
ings with the partnership to the extent at least of assuring the application of
N.C.A. funds for their intended purpose.
McGlynn v. Schultz, 90 NJ. Super. 505, 218 A.2d 408, 413 (1966), aff'd, 95 N.J.
Super. 412, 231 A.2d 386 (1967). See generally Comment, Regulation of Real Es-
tate Syndications: An Overview, 49 WASH. L. REv. 137, 155-56 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Comment].
In the event of wrongful conduct by the general partner such as conspiring to de-
fraud the partnership in operation and sale of partnership real estate, a representative
action will lie on behalf of the limited partnership. Alpert v. Haimes, 64 Misc. 2d 608,
315 N.Y.S.2d 332 (1970). But see Millard v. Newmark & Co., 24 App. Div. 2d 333,
266 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1966).
33. See notes 59-60 and accompanying text infra.
34. See Cummings v. Nordmark, 73 Wn. 2d 322, 438 P.2d 605 (1968); 2 S.
ROWLEY, MODERN LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 53.9, at 570 (2d ed. 1960).
35. Compare WASH. REv. CODE § 25.04.210(1) (1974), with Cummings v.
Nordmark, 73 Wn. 2d 322, 324, 438 P.2d 605, 606 (1968).
36. 1 S. ROWLEY, MODERN LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 21.1, at 523-24 (2d ed. 1960).
In Allen v. Steinberg, 244 Md. 119, 223 A.2d 240, 246 (1966), the court applied the
same analysis in a limited partnership situation, stating: "[T] he principle of utmost
good faith covers not only dealings and transactions occurring during the partnership
but also those faking place during the negotiations leading to the formation of the
partnership." Promoters have long been held liable to their corporations as fiduciaries
in cases where the corporation was formed for the purpose of acquiring properties
from the promoters but the promoters neglected to disclose their profits from the
transactions to their associates. In Victor Oil Co. v. Drum, 184 Cal. 226, 193 P. 243,
246 (1920), the court held the promdters to a duty to either disclose anticipated
profits or to sell the property at their cost, stating:
[I] he essence of the business was that the defendants, through the medium of a
corporation, induced a number of persons to associate with them for the pur-
chase of certain properties for prices greater than the properties could be ob-
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proposed partnership so that a potential investor may reach an in-
formed decision. This may be accomplished by incorporating the gen-
eral partner's profit formula into the articles of limited partnership
along with each limited partner's signature on the certificate of limited
partnership.37 Without these safeguards, a subsequent transaction may
well be invalidated. The Bassan court's refusal to find implied consent
by the limited partners to profits on the Murakami transaction based
on acquiescence in profits taken on earlier transactions, 38 coupled
with the requirement of full and complete disclosure, indicates the
court has properly read a requirement of "express" consent into Sec-
tion 21(1).39
tained for, and without any disclosure either of that fact or of the fact that the
defendants expected to harvest the difference in price, and had an interest in
having the purchase made distinct from their interest in the association and
adverse to the association ... but out of the moneys which their associates would
contribute.
See also Mangold v. Adrian Irrigation Co., 60 Wash. 286, 111 P. 173 (1910) (pro-
moters may not profit at expense of the corporation; they are trustees who will be
held to the utmost good faith); Colville Valley Coal Co. v. Rogers, 123 Wash. 360,
212 P. 732 (1923) (promoter is agent of associates of proposed corporation and, as a
fiduciary. may not acquire property, selling it to the corporation at much more than
the price paid to the original seller).
37. WULPA § 2. WASH. REV. CODE § 25.08.020 (1974); see note 6 supra.
38. 83 Wn. 2d at 927, 524 P.2d at 237:
The limited partners . . .could only consent after the fact to whatever profit the
general partner determined it should have as to a particular transaction. Because
of this, although the limited partners may have consented after the fact to spe-
cific profits taken on previous transactions, this could not imply consent to the
Murakami transaction because the limited partners could not know what the
profit to Investment Exchange Corporation was until after the sale closed.
This simply means that the consent of the limited partners may be implied only if no
action is taken after the transaction is closed and the general partner's profits are re-
vealed. In no event could consent on the present transaction be implied from consent
to profits on earlier transactions as the net result would be an unlimited license by the
general partner to set its future profits at whatever rate it chose, in complete disregard
of its obligations to the limited partnership.
39. The position of the Bassan dissent that consent to additional compensation
could be implied after formation of the partnership is ill-founded for at least three
reasons. First, the relationship of the partners is expressly defined by the written
agreements between the parties such that "it is presumed that they delegated all the
powers they wished to confer upon each other and withheld all powers or authority
not affirmatively delegated." Frankfort Oil Co. v. Snakard, 279 F.2d 436. 443 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 920 (1960). See also Weizer v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d
772 (6th Cir. 1948). Thus, the general partner's compensation for services is specified
in the express provisions for management fees, commissions and fees paid to the
general partner's subsidiaries, and a share of the ultimate partnership profits. See note
49 and accompanying text infra. Second. the WULPA expressly requires that partner-
ship rights be specified in writing, WULPA § 9, WASH. REV. CODE § 25.08.090 (1974),
and the rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly con-
strued is not applicable to limited partnership statutes. Id. § 28(1), WASH. REV. CODE
§ 25.08.280(1) (1974). Third, as a practical matter, the limited partners lack direct
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D. Effect of the Articles of Limited Partnership
The Bassan court recognized that self-dealing by a general partner
in a limited partnership may be sanctioned, however, if it is expressly
provided for in the articles of limited partnership: 40
Partners may include in the partnership articles practically any agree-
ment they wish and if the asserted self-dealing was actually contem-
plated and specifically authorized with a method for determining, in
advance, the amount of the profit it would not, ipso facto, be imper-
missible and deemed wrongful.
Thus, the general partner may be entitled to skim profit from transac-
tions with the partnership, but only to the extent expressly authorized
in the articles of partnership. 41
II. THE GENERAL PARTNER'S FIDUCIARY DUTY OF
DISCLOSURE
A. Nature of Limited Partnership and Potential Abuses
Problems with conflicts-of-interest and self-dealing are most diffi-
cult to avoid where, as in most limited partnerships, the general
partner has virtually unchecked managerial powers. 42 This is espe-
cially true where, as in Bassan, the limited partnership deals in real
estate, the general partner is a corporate entity incorporated solely to
promote, manage and participate in the real estate business through
limited partnerships, and the limited partners tend to be inexperienced
investors. 43 In exchange for limited liability,44 together with antici-
control over the general partner and hence lack a meaningful bargaining position;
thus a "course of dealings" argument supporting a finding of implied consent by the
limited partners is most inappropriate in this context.
40. 83 Wn. 2d at 925, 524 P.2d at 236. The court relied upon Riviera Congress
Ass'n v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 548, 223 N.E.2d 876, 880, 277 N.Y.S.2d 386, 392
(1966).
41. See Roediger v. Reid, 133 Wash. 608, 234 P. 452 (1925) (partner not en-
titled to salary in the absence of an agreement, express or implied); Williams v.
Pedersen, 47 Wash. 472, 92 P. 287 (1907) (mere inequality of services alone not
ground for greater compensation in absence of an agreement, express or implied).
See also Johnson v. Hamilton, 141 Wash. 248, 251 P. 274 (1926); Boothe v. Summit
Coal Mining Co., 72 Wash. 679, 131 P. 252 (1913).
42. See Comment, supra note 32, at 150-51.
43. See Part I-A supra.
44. The limited partnership is a creature of statute (WULPA, WASH. REV. CODE
ch. 25.08 (1974) designed to provide an alternative to the corporate form of invest-
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pated benefits of cash flow, tax shelter and ultimate capital apprecia-
tion,45 the limited partners in a real estate limited partnership must
entrust the general partner with the day-to-day management of their
investments. 46 Thus, the limited partners do not have a voice in deter-
mining which parcels of real property will be purchased at what
prices, since such determinations are part of the general partner's
"control" of the partnership business.47 Section 1 of the WULPA
demands in turn that the managing general partner be subject to un-
limited personal liability.48
ment, and in fact provides certain investors greater advantages. See note 45 infra.
Observation of the limitations placed upon the limited partner's participation in
partnership affairs exempts the limited partner from general liability and risks only
the amount of his or her original subscription in the limited partnership. See WULPA
§§ 7 & 17. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 25.08.070, .170 (1974); Lichtyger v. Franchard
Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 528, 536, 223 N.E.2d 869, 873, 277 N.Y.S.2d 377, 383 (1966).
45. In a real estate limited partnership, cash flow is generated by the excess of
rental income over expenses. Tax shelter may be achieved via deductions for de-
preciation, interest and losses. Capital appreciation may result upon the ultimate dis-
posal of the partnership's real estate. Comment, supra note 32, at 140. The primary
reason for organizing a real estate venture as a limited partnership rather than as a
corporation is to obtain partnership treatment for federal income tax purposes. The
form of organization appeals to an investor interested in the "pass-through" of partner-
ship losses deductible from other ordinary income as well as the potential income
reportable as long term capital gains. Hrusoff & Cazares, Formation of the Public
Limited Partnership, 22 HAST. L.J. 87, 96 (1970). For a sample prospectus of a real
estate limited partnership promising these features, see Prospectus for American
Housing Partners. August 31. 1971. in I NOTABLE SYNDICATIONS 5. 15-17 (S. Roulac
ed. 1972).
46. WASH. REv. CODE § 25.08.070 (1974) was amended in 1972. Ch. 113. § 2,
[ 1972] Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 253-54, and now provides:
(1) A limited partner shall not become liable as a general partner unless, in addi-
tion to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes part in
the control of the business.
(2) A limited partner shall not be deemed to take part in the control of the busi-
ness by virtue of his possessing or exercising a power, specified in the certificate.
to vote upon matters affecting the basic structure of the partnership, including
the following matters or others of a similar nature:
(a) Election, removal, or substitution of general partners, including, but not
limited to, transfer of a majority of the voting stock of a corporate general
partner.
(b) Termination of the partnership.
(c) Amendment of the partnership agreement.
(d) Sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the partnership.
(3) The statement of powers set forth in subsection (2) of this section shall not
be construed as exclusive or as indicating that any other powers possessed or
exercised by a limited partner shall be sufficient to cause such limited partner to
be deemed to take part in the control of the business within the meaning of sub-
section (1) of this section.
(ULPA § 7 (1969) includes only subsection (1).)
47. See generally Comment, "Control" in the Limited Partnership, 7 JOHN MAR-
SHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 416, 420-22 (1974).
48. WASH. REV. CODE § 25.08.010 (1974). There is dispute whether a corporation
may become a partner in a limited partnership. Although § 2 of the WULPA pro-
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Entrusted with full managerial control of the partnership's business
interests, the general partner in a real estate limited partnership gener-
ally receives compensation for various promotional and management
activities in the form of:49 (1) brokerage commissions or fees on the
sale of property to the partnership; (2) property management fees and
further commissions or fees from the lease or sale of partnership prop-
erties to third parties; and (3) portfolio investment fees or promotional
interests in the partnership, i.e., a share of the ultimate profits of the
partnership. Manipulation of these profit features by the general part-
ner, without disclosing the actual amounts withdrawn from the part-
nership or providing a formula by which the general partner's with-
drawals are to be calculated, creates a high potential for abuse by the
general partner.
An even more egregious example is suggested by the fact that the
general partner may realize "gain" on the sale of property to the part-
nership, as though it were an arm's length transaction. The general
partner may obtain an unduly high appraisal upon sale to the limited
partnership, and thus realize undeserved profits based upon the ficti-
tious spread between its cost and an artificial fair market value.50
Such potential for abuse clearly indicates a need to impose a fiduciary
duty on the general partner of a real estate limited partnership, as the
vides that a limited partnership may be formed by two or more persons, it does not
define "person." There is some authority for the view that the basis for the rule pre-
cluding corporations from becoming partners in a "venture" also applies with respect
to a corporation becoming a general partner in a limited partnership. 2 S. ROWLEY,
MODERN LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 53.2, at 555 (2d ed. 1960). There is a noticeable
trend, however, to permit corporations to serve as general partners. Id. at 555-56
n.30.
Although the issue has never been formally adjudicated in Washington, it is ap-
parently a long-standing practice to form a corporation for the purpose of serving as
a general partner in a limited partnership. (Investment Exchange Corporation was
formed for that purpose in 1956. Prospectus, supra note 9, at 6.) The fact that a
corporation may be formed for any lawful purpose implies that a corporation may
be a general partner. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 23A.08.010-.020 (1974); Comment,
Public Limited Partnerships in Northwest Real Estate Syndication, 7 WILLAMETTE L.J.
74, 75-76 (1971).
49. See Augustine, The Public Real Estate Limited Partnership-An Introduction,
in D. AUGUSTINE & R. LOWELL, REAL ESTATE SYNDICATIONS 1, 17 (1972). See also
Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 528, 223 N.E.2d 869, 277 N.Y.S.2d 377
(1966) (limited partners entitled to bring derivative action for breach of fiduciary
duty against a general partner who impaired the limited partners' investment return
by reducing the rental rates on partnership property; the general partner received a
fixed management fee which was unaffected by the rental reduction).
50. See Part I-B supra.
987
Washington Law Review
Washington court did in Bassan. The court, however, left the content
and scope of the duty undefined.
B. The Duty of Disclosure in Related Areas
Due to the paucity of case law in the limited partnership area, the
precedential value of Bassan would have been enhanced had the court
attempted to delineate the parameters of the general partner's fidu-
ciary duty. The court could have explored the nature of the fiduciary
duty of the general partner, both as to disclosure and limitation of
compensation, by considering analogous areas of law such as the cor-
porate director-shareholder relationship and the managing partner-
partner relationship.
As with the corporate shareholder who relies on the corporate
directors and officers for information regarding the organization's
business transactions, the limited partner is wholly dependent upon
the representations of the general partner. Both forms of enterprise
involve a separation between investor and management. The limited
partner has no control over the partnership's day-to-day business, ex-
cept through right of refusal to concur in certain acts for which his or
her consent is required by law. 51 The limited partner is much like the
holder of participating preferred stock: liability of both is limited to
their original investment;52 both are ordinarily treated for accounting
and credit purposes as holding equity rather than debt;53 and both are
often privileged only to inspect the organization's books, to be kept
51. WULPA § 9. WASH. REV. CODE § 25.08.090(1974) provides in part:
[W] ithout the written consent or ratification of the specific act by all the limited
partners, a general partner or all of the general partners have no authority to:
(1) Do any act in contravention of the certificate;
(2) Do any act which would make it impossible to carry on the ordinary busi-
ness of the partnership;
(3) Confess ajudgment against the partnership;
(4) Possess partnership property, or assign their rights in specific partnership
property, for other than a partnership purpose;
(5) Admit a person as a general partner;
(6) Admit a person as a limited partner, unless the right to do so is given in
the certificate;
(7) Continue the business with partnership property on the death, retirement, or
insanity of a general partner, unless the right to do so is given in the certificate.
52. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.210 with § 25.08.170(1974).
53. 2 S. ROWLEY, MODERN LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 53.16, at 578 (2d ed. 1960);
Bayse, A Survey of the Limited Partnership Form of Business Organization, 42 ORE.
L. REV. 35, 50-51 (1962).
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informed, and to seek an accounting or dissolution in appropriate cir-
cumstances. 5
4
In view of the substantial degree of similarity between the status of
limited partners and that of corporate shareholders, it is instructive to
consider the degree of loyalty demanded of a corporate fiduciary. In
State ex rel. Hayes Oyster Co. v. Keypoint Oyster Co.,5 5 the Wash-
ington Supreme Court held that a corporate officer occupies a rela-
tionship to the private corporation and its shareholders "akin to that
of a trustee, and owe [s] undivided loyalty, and a standard of be-
havior above that of the workaday world." 56 The result is that neither
directors nor officers may directly or indirectly acquire secret personal
profit or advantage through business transactions allegedly on behalf
of the corporation.57 The Hayes court specified that "nondisclosure by
54. Compare WASH. REV. CODE §§ 23A.08.460 & 25.08.100 with § 25.08.070
(1974). As indicated in note 46 supra, Washington law grants the limited partner
relatively more managerial influence than the preferred shareholder by permitting
the limited partner to vote on certain matters affecting the basic structure of the
partnership. These powers however, do not constitute an exercise of "control" so as
to subject the limited partners to unlimited liability. More importantly, these powers
are not of a nature which would enable the limited partners to check the general
partner's day-to-day withdrawals of partnership funds in order to thwart possible
general partner self-dealing. Also, it is important to note that Subsection (2)(d) of
Washington's 1972 amendments, now WASH. REV. CODE § 25.08.070(2) (d) (1974),
does not reach sales from the general partner to the limited partnership.
In the main, the relationship between the general and limited partners is more like
that of trustee and beneficiary. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294
(2d Cir. 1965); Allen v. Steinberg, 244 Md. 119, 223 A.2d 240 (1966); Riviera Con-
gress Associates v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 223 N.E.2d 876, 277 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1966);
Lichtyger v. Franchard, 18 N.Y.2d 528, 223 N.E.2d 869, 277 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1966).
55. 64 Wn. 2d 375, 391 P.2d 979 (1964). Hayes, an officer of Coast Oyster Cor-
poration, negotiated the sale of Coast to Keypoint Oyster Company and secretly
agreed that in exchange for his cosignature on Keypoint's loan, he would receive
stock in Keypoint. Thus, Hayes obtained secret profit and personal advantage at the
expense of Coast Oyster Corporation. See Williams v. Queen Fisheries, Inc., 2 Wn.
App. 691, 469 P.2d 583 (1970) (corporate officer's use of corporation's equipment,
employees, credit and funds to establish a personal business constituted a breach of
the officer's fiduciary duty of loyalty and warranted an accounting as well as discharge
of the officer).
56. 64 Wn. 2d at 381, 391 P.2d at 983.
57. See Leppaluoto v. Eggleston, 57 Wn. 2d 393, 357 P.2d 725 (1960) (profits
gained by a corporate officer in an unauthorized transaction on behalf of the corpora-
tion belong to the corporation); Sanders v. E-Z Park, Inc., 57 Wn. 2d 474, 358 P.2d
138 (1960) (action taken by board of directors, for which director with personal
financial interest voted, is voidable by the stockholders); Larson v. A. W. Larson Co.,
36 Wn. 2d 271, 217 P.2d 789 (1950) (officers of a corporation are bound to exercise
the utmost good faith in conserving corporate property and furthering corporate in-
terests). See also Kane v. Klos, 50 Wn. 2d 778, 314 P.2d 672 (1957); Arneman v.
Arneman, 43 Wn. 2d 787, 264 P.2d 256 (1953); Shermer v. Baker, 2 Wn. App. 845,
472 P.2d 589 (1970).
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an interested director or officer is, in itself, unfair. This wholesome
rule can be applied automatically without any of the unsatisfactory
results which flowed from a rigid bar against self-dealing." 5 8
Further explanation of the type of disclosure required in a Bassan-
type relationship may be derived from the nonlimited general partner-
ship principles which have long required full disclosure of facts mate-
rial to a transaction with the partnership.5 9 Thus, a sale of property by
one partner to the partnership will be "sustained only when it is made
in good faith, for a fair consideration and on a full and complete dis-
closure of all important information as to value. '60
C. The Duty of Disclosure in the Limited Partnership Context
It is arguable that the obligation running from the general partner
to the limited partners is even greater in the limited partnership situa-
tion than in that of the nonlimited, general partnership because of the
limited partners' restricted voice in the partnership business.6' The
58. 64 Wn. 2d at 382. 391 P.2d at 984. Similarly, the Bassan court concluded that
nondisclosure of the general partner's profit interest in a transaction is ipso facto
unfair, irrespective of whether the profits might be reasonable. At that point, the
limited partners had an option of granting the general partner its profits or denying
them in total while still taking the opportunity. Although the court found it un-
necessary to decide, it implied the limited partners may consent to exorbitant profits
to the general partner upon full and complete disclosure. Such disclosure creates a
rebuttable presumption of fairness. Note. however, that WASH. AD. CODE § 460-32A-
045(c) (1975) specifies that a price to the partnership in excess of the general partner's
original cost is now presumptively unfair unless some material change has occurred to
the property since it was acquired by the general partner. See notes 106-07 infra.
59. See Karle v. Seder, 35 Wn. 2d 542, 550, 214 P.2d 684, 688 (1950) (in the
sale and purchase of general partnership interests, each partner is "required to make
a full disclosure of all material facts within his knowledge in any way relating to
partnership affairs"): Simich v. Culjak, 27 Wn. 2d 403, 178 P.2d 336 (1947) (the
managing partner acts as a trustee for the partnership); Kittilsby v. Vevelstad. 103
Wash. 126. 129, 173 P. 744, 745 (1918) ("[T]here is no stronger fiduciary relation
known to the law than that of copartnership, where one man's property and property
rights are subject to a large extent to the control and administration of another.").
See also Morrison v. Ultican. 35 Wn. 2d 504. 213 P.2d 617 (1950); Danich v. Culjak.
190 Wash. 79. 66 P.2d 860 (1937).
60. Karle v. Seder, 35 Wn. 2d 542, 550, 214 P.2d 684. 688 (1950). In Finn v.
Young. 46 Wash. 74, 77, 89 P. 400, 401 (1907), the court stated:
A sale by one partner to another of his partnership interest will not be sustained
unless made for a fair consideration and upon full disclosure by the vendee to
the vendor of whatever information he has as to the value of such property: and
concealment of a material fact by the party whose duty it is to disclose it is suf-
ficient to annul the compact.
See also cases cited in note 59 stpra. The rule is the same for promoters. See note 36
slpra.
61. See Part II-A and note 51 and accompanying text supra.
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concept of an agency relationship between partners applied to general
partnerships cannot be properly applied to the limited partnership sit-
uation: "The principal-agent relationship which exists between the
partners of an ordinary partnership is not present between the limited
and general partners of a limited partnership. '62
One authority has broadly characterized the fiduciary duty of a
general partner in a real estate limited partnership as consisting of two
aspects:63
First, the general partner owes the limited partners a duty of good
faith, loyalty and due care. The general partner must act in the best
interests of the partnership and in a manner reasonably calculated to
benefit the partnership financially.
Second, the general partner must comply with the provisions of the
partnership agreement and whatever other representations (e.g. the
prospectus or offering circular) were made to the limited partners at
the time the limited partners committed capital to the partnership.
In short, the general partner must disclose all material facts bearing
on the investment decision and subsequent management of the limited
partnership, and must limit its compensation so as both to comply
with the express agreement of the parties and to promote the financial
interests of the limited partnership. Although the Bassan court made it
clear that nondisclosure of a material fact constitutes, per se, a breach
of the general partner's fiduciary duty,64 its recognition of the highest
degree of loyalty owing from the general partner to the limited part-
nership implies that, in future cases, the court may go beyond disclo-
sure to analyze the ultimate fairness of the transaction to the limited
partners.
III. FAIRNESS OF THE TRANSACTION
That in Bassan the general partner took substantial profits on the
Murakami transaction, and that there was an obvious absence of an
62. Lynn v. Cohen, 359 F. Supp. 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
63. Lowell, Selected Problems in D. AUGUSTINE & R. LOWELL, REAL ESTATE
SYNDICATIONS 33, 168 (1972).
64. The Washington court has already imposed the duty to disclose all material
facts in other investment contexts. See, e.g., Boonstra v. Stevens-Norton. Inc., 64 Wn.
2d 621, 323 P.2d 287 (1964) (mortgage broker); Sigman v. Stevens-Norton, Inc., 70
Wn. 2d 915, 425 P.2d 891 (1967) (mortgage broker); Shermer v. Baker, 2 Wn. App.
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arm's length bargain, permit the inference that the court's disposition
was in some measure a reaction to the lack of substantive fairness of
the transaction. Developments in this area may have greater impact
on limited partnerships than the basic proposition of full disclosure of
the general partner's anticipated profits. The following sections outline
means by which the court may judge future challenges to transactions
whereby general partners have engaged in self-dealing.
A. The Arm's Length Bargain Test
The long-standing rule governing fiduciaries requires that where
any portion of their transactions with the organization is challenged, it
will be rigorously scrutinized. 65 The burden is on the fiduciary to
prove its good faith and to show the inherent fairness of the transac-
tion. 66 The test is "whether or not under all the circumstances the
transaction carries the earmarks of an arm's length bargain." 67 The
value of the test in the limited partnership context lies in assessing the
original formation to determine whether the agreement bears the ap-
pearance of a duly-negotiated bargain and whether provision was
made in the agreement for ongoing transactions between the general
partner and the partnership. Had the Bassan court expressly applied
845, 472 P.2d 589 (1970) (duty of majority stockholder purchasing stock of minority
stockholder to disclose all material facts affecting the value of the stock known to
the majority stockholder but not the minority stockholder).
65. See Ong Hing v. Arizona Harness Raceway, Inc., 10 Ariz. App. 380. 459 P.2d
107 (1969) (where director deals with his or her corporation, and his or her interest
is adverse to that of the corporation, the transaction will be closely scrutinized):
Tovrea Land & Cattle Co. v. Linsenmeyer, 100 Ariz. 107, 412 P.2d 47 (1966) (same):
Central Building Co. v. Keystone Shares Corp.. 185 Wash. 645. 56 P.2d 697
(1936) (courts will always closely scrutinize any transaction between officers or trus-
tees and the corporation); Tefft v. Schaefer. 148 Wash. 602. 269 P. 1048 (1928)
(court will closely scrutinize acts of corporate officers in directing expenditures which
result in personal profit or advantage to majority stockholders).
66. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) (bankruptcy court may require con-
trolling shareholder to establish fairness of claims for salary); Merger Mines Corp.
v. Grismer, 137 F.2d 335 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 794 (1943) (pro-
moter must show good faith and inherent fairness of stock and loan transactions
with corporation).
67. Pepper v. Litton. 308 U.S. 295, 307 (1939). See also Spach v. Bryant. 309
F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd & remanded on other grounds, 343 F.2d 581 (5th
Cir. 1965): In re Automatic Washer Co.. 226 F. Supp. 834 (S.D. Iowa). aff'd, 338
F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1964); Efron v. Kalmanovitz, 226 Cal. App. 2d 546, 38 Cal.
Rptr. 148 (1964); Holi-Rest, Inc. v. Treloar, 217 N.W.2d 517 (Iowa 1974): Sorin v.




this test, it could only have concluded that the Murakami "bargain"
was "negotiated" by the general partner with itself, and that there was
not one earmark of an arm's length bargain. Instead, the court based
its opinion solely upon the general partner's failure to disclose a profit
formula. Disclosure alone, however, does not guarantee that the fea-
tures of an arm's length bargain will be present. 68 Moreover, not all
arm's length bargains will satisfy the fiduciary duty of the general
partner in a limited partnership. 69
B. The Business Opportunity Doctrine
If an officer or director, for personal profit, takes advantage of an
opportunity in which the corporation has a legitimate interest, the
opportunity will be deemed held in trust for the benefit of the corpora-
tion.70 This doctrine of "corporate opportunity" is equally applicable
in the general partnership context.71
Whether the business opportunity properly belongs to the organiza-
tion depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.72 If they
68. In Bassan, there was disclosure that the general partner was profiting on sales
to the partnership in the form of an accounting footnote in the partnership financial
statement. The statement was issued after the limited partners had committed their
investments and indicated property acquired by Auburn West Associates for $642,343
had cost Investment Exchange $459,000. 83 Wn. 2d at 922, 524 P.2d at 233. In
addition, a prospectus prepared in 1969 for the SEC indicated that from May 1964
through December 1965 Auburn West had acquired eight parcels from Investment
Exchange, whose basis in those parcels was $488,221, for $749,250. Id. This is not,
however, the type of disclosure which is conducive to informed investment decision-
making. For a discussion of minimum disclosure requirements, see Part I1-C supra.
69. See Part IV-C infra.
70. See Humphries v. Riveland, 67 Wn. 2d 376, 407 P.2d 967 (1965); Bangasser
& Associates, Inc. v. Hedges, 58 Wn. 2d 514, 364 P.2d 237 (1961).
71. In re Wilson's Estate, 50 Wn. 2d 840, 315 P.2d 287 (1957) (purchase of
Caterpillar by partner from partner who had died several years previously held a pur-
chase for the benefit of the partnership as the transaction was clearly connected with
the logging partnership business); Stewart v. Ullrich, 117 Wash. 109, 201 P. 16
(1921); Shrader v. Downing, 79 Wash. 476, 140 P. 558 (1914); Elle v. Babbitt, 259
Ore. 590, 488 P.2d 440 (1971) (partner may not use for personal benefit information
or opportunities which properly belong to partnership). In Foucek v. Janicek, 90 Ore.
251, 225 P.2d 783 (1950), defendant-partner allegedly accepted for himself an offer
made to the partnership which amounted to $50,000 or more from a joint venture
arrangement for purchase and resale of war surplus materials. After finding the cor-
porate opportunity doctrine applicable to partnership law, the court held that a
partner may not use information acquired in the course of the partnership's business
for private gain and will be required to share the profits therefrom even though they
accrue after termination of the partnership. See also Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y.
458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928) (joint venture).
72. See Alvest, Inc., v. Superior Oil Corp., 398 P.2d 213 (Alas. 1965); New v.
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indicate the opportunity was within the realm of the organization's
business and the organization had the capacity to acquire it, the offi-
cer, director or managing partner will be held to a duty to acquire the
opportunity for the organization.7 3
The business opportunity doctrine should be found generally appli-
cable in the real estate limited partnership context, at least with re-
spect to post-formation transactions. Upon formation of the partner-
ship, it is expected that the general partner will locate property at a
relatively low price which, due to the nature of its location, is likely to
show a substantial appreciation in the near future. The general
partner will in turn sell the property to the limited partnership, re-
ceiving a fixed finder's fee or other similar compensation for acquisi-
tion services as set forth in the partnership agreement.74 No profit
spread is contemplated. Therefore, in Bassan, the court could have
found that the profit margin taken by the general partner, Investment
Exchange, on the spread between its cost and the alleged fair market
value of the Murakami parcel was an appropriation of a limited part-
nership business opportunity such that a constructive trust would be
imposed in favor of the limited partnership in the amount of Invest-
ment Exchange's net profit on the sale.
IV. DISCLOSURE, FAIRNESS AND SUBSTANTIVE
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION: THE NEW
WASHINGTON RULES
The transactions in Bassan occurred before adoption of the Wash-
ington Rules for Real Estate Limited Partnerships (Washington
New, 148 Cal. App. 2d 372, 306 P.2d 987 (1957); Hartung v. Architects Hartung/
Odle/Burke. Inc.. 301 N.E.2d 240 (Ind. App. 1973).
73. Paulman v. Kritzer. 139 Il1. App. 282. 219 N.E.2d 541 (1966). aff'd. 38 II. 2d
101, 230 N.E.2d 262 (1967) (Where defendant corporate director purchased property
with corporate funds and on resale retained profits personally, corporation had right
to claim the benefits of the transaction); Hubbard v. Pape. 2 Ohio App. 326. 203
N.E.2d 365 (1964) (Where evidence established that corporate officer, in violation of
duly-enacted regulations of the corporation, had purchased capital stock without first
offering the stock to the company at book value, officer was required to transfer the
opportunity to the corporation). See also Kaufman v. Wolfson. 153 F. Supp. 253
(S.D.N.Y. 1957).
74. See Comment, supra note 32, at 148-49; Augustine, The Public Real Estate
Limited Partnership-An Introduction, in D. AUGUSTINE & R. LOVELL. REAL ESTATE
SYNDICATIONS 15- 16 (1972): note 107 and accompanying text infra.
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Rules)75 and thus were not subject to them. These regulations recently
underwent major revision, incorporating and adapting much of the
substance of the Guidelines of the Midwest Securities Commissioners
Association (Midwest Guidelines).76 This recent revision was ap-
parently in response to the substantial number of limited partnership
offerings77 and their increased availability to the less sophisticated
investor.78 The new Washington Rules combine the disclosure and
fairness tests for transactions involving the general partner and the
limited partnership: disclosure provides the marrow of the new rules,
a presumption of unfairness to the partnership provides the sinew.
Although a substantial number of ongoing limited partnerships may
be exempt, the new rules should serve as guidelines for judicial scru-
75. WASH. AD. CODE §§ 460-32A-010 et seq. (1975). The Washington Rules
became effective April 1, 1975. All filings through March 31, 1975 remain subject to
the old rules in WASH. AD. CODE §§ 460-32-010 et seq. (1972), but may have been
formulated in accordance with the new rules. Id. § 460-IOA-400(1). The Washington
Rules apply to registrations of real estate programs in the form of limited partner-
ships and will be applied by analogy to real estate programs in other forms. Id. §
460-32A-010(1).
76. Midwest Securities Commissioner's Ass'n, Statement of Policy Regarding
Real Estate Programs, [Current] BLUE SKY L. REP. 4821 (adopted) Feb. 28. 1973;
amended Feb. 26, 1974). California has followed the Midwest Guidelines closely
in promulgating regulations under CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25000-804 (West Supp.
1975). See CAL. AD. CODE tit. 10 §§ 260.140.110 et seq. (1974).
77. Accurate statistics on the number of limited partnership filings per year are not
available for Washington. In 1974, however, the Securities Division of the Washington
State Department of Motor Vehicles polled the three most populous counties in
Washington State (King, Pierce and Spokane) for a determination of the number of
limited partnerships filed in 1973. There were approximately 300 filings and amend-
ments in total for those three counties with an estimated total of 500 filings and
amendments statewide. Telephone conversation with Robert Klein, Securities Div.,
Dep't of Motor Vehicles, Olympia, Wash., Mar. 31, 1975.
78. Van Camp, Living With Tax Shelters in California: A Discussion of the New
California Real Estate Syndication Rules, 7 U.S.F.L. REv. 403 (1973). Mr. Van
Camp was the California Commissioner of Corporations from 1971 to 1973 and
president of the Midwest Securities Association from 1973 to 1974. He explains the
need for greater regulatory measures in the following terms:
For many years, limited partnerships have been a popular vehicle for the in-
vestment of funds into projects which yield higher than ordinary tax advantages.
Historically they have been used primarily by wealthier citizens who sought either
tax loss programs or tax shelter programs. These persons were usually well ad-
vised by very competent tax lawyers, accountants and real estate professional
advisors. Only within the last five or six years have these programs been mar-
keted to the broader public at large. The new investors have not always been as
well represented by professional advisors. This factor along with the rapidly in-
creasing number of publicly offered programs and the large sums of money
raised have all resulted in an increased interest in tax shelter programs by securi-




tiny of challenged limited partnership abuses similar to those in
Bassan. This section of the note provides an overview and analysis of
the capacity of the Washington Rules to insure reasonable real estate
limited partnership offerings. In particular, the following problems are
discussed: adequacy of investor protection where there are minimal
general partner and no investor suitability standards; the value of de-
tailed disclosure documents; the methods utilized to curb general
partner self-dealing in transactions with the partnership; the value of a
limited form of "control" exercisable by limited partners; and the ap-
proach of the new rules to the special problems raised by nonspecified
properties or "blind pool" offerings.
A. The Members: Sponsor and Investor Suitability Standards
In order to protect creditor reliance upon the solvency of the gen-
eral partner, the Washington Rules now impose a net worth require-
ment on the sponsor79 of a real estate program.8 0 However, where the
Washington Rules regulate with one hand, they salve with the other
by excepting the net worth requirement if the sponsor can show that it
is not "necessary to the viability of the program."81 This exception is
as unfortunate as it is confusing. The term "viability of the program"
is undefined and begs the questions of investor protection and general
partner solvency, the very questions to which the net worth require-
ment attempts to respond.82 Another weakness of the net worth re-
79. A "sponsor" is defined as:
any person directly or indirectly instrumental in organizing, wholly or in part, a
[partnership] program or any person who will manage or participate in the
management of a program, including the general partner(s) and any affiliate of
any such person, but does not include a person whose only relation with the
program is as that of an independent property manager, whose only compensa-
tion is as such. "Sponsor" does not include wholly independent third parties such
as attorneys, accountants, and underwriters whose only compensation is for pro-
fessional services rendered in connection with the offering of syndicate interests.
WASH. AD. CODE § 460- 1OA-155 (1975).
80. The sponsor's minimum financial net worth must equal at least 5% of the
gross amount of all offerings in the past 12 months plus 5% of the gross amount of
the current offering to a maximum net worth of $1,000,000. Id. § 460-32A-015.
81. Id.
82. Compare Midwest Guidelines, supra note 76, at Part 1I-B. By leaving the
minimum net worth requirement for general partners unqualified, the Midwest
Guidelines set a floor above which a general partner is presumed solvent which in
turn provides a minimum assurance to creditors that their accounts will be satisfied.
This aids the partnership in establishing its investment program while limiting at least
one of the risks. i.e.. general partner viability, to potential investors.
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quirement section is that it stops short of effectively guaranteeing con-
tinued general partner reliability by requiring evidence of an ability to
maintain net worth for a significant period after the offering is com-
pleted.83 The section also provides no assurance of general partner
competence as would an additional requirement of minimum relevant
business experience.8 4
While attempting to assure the reliability and capacity of a poten-
tial general partner, there should also be some effort to insure investor
suitability. This the Washington Rules do not attempt. By compari-
son, due to the "limited transferability, the relative lack of liquidity,
and the specific tax orientation of many real estate Programs, 8s5 the
Midwest Guidelines require sponsors to establish and apply suitability
standards to potential investors.8 6 The standards are to be formulated
in view of the program's investment policies to determine the type of
person who could benefit from, as well as afford, the long-term risks
of the investment. If a program's investment policies are aimed at cre-
ating tax deductions and long-term appreciation through real estate
acquisitions and development, the offering should be limited to those
in higher income tax brackets who can bear the relative illiquidity of
this type of real estate investment. 87
83. Id. "The general partners shall present evidence of ability to maintain this
net worth for a period of three years after completion of the offering."
84. Compare id. at Part II-A, which requires the sponsor and the general partner
or their chief operating officers to have at least two years relevant real estate experi-
ence and the person providing services to the partnership to have no less than four
years relevant experience in the type of service being rendered or demonstrate suffi-
cient knowledge and experience to perform the proposed services. The lack of general
partner management experience is among the chief factors which studies indicate lead
to the failure of some real estate syndicates. Van Camp, supra note 78, at 404.
85. Midwest Guidelines, supra note 76, at Part Ill-A.
86. The Midwest Guidelines, id. at Parts 11-A, C & D, require that the sponsor
maintain records of information indicating its investors meet the suitability standards
formulated for a particular program. Initially, the suitability standards proposed by
the sponsor must be submitted to the securities administrator for review for fairness.
Substantive standards set forth in the Midwest Guidelines include a minimum invest-
ment of $2,500 per investor for low risk offerings and a minimum initial cash pur-
chase of $5,000 per investor in the high risk or primarily tax oriented offerings. It is
unclear that such quantitative requirements insure investor sophistication but they
could provide some assurance that those who cannot afford an illiquid investment
will be deterred from investing their life savings.
87. Specifically, where the primary benefit will be the application of partnership
deductions against the investor's own taxable income from other sources, only those
with significant taxable incomes should purchase the units. Second, in many cases
there will be little cash flow, particularly if unimproved land is held for appreciation
or, as for example, in the case of investment in federally-assisted housing projects
where the FHA limits project owners to a minimal cash return. In addition, manage-
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B. The Disclosure Documents
The new Washington Rules require that at least 25 specific factors
be described in the limited partnership prospectus, 88 among which are
included: risk factors;89 business experience over the last 10 years of
the general partners or of the principal officers of a corporate general
partner; all direct and indirect compensation to be paid to the general
partner; investment objectives and policies; 90 "track records" of the
general partner; a summary of the terms of the proposed limited part-
nership including any self-dealing contemplated by the general
partner; a summary of the federal tax consequences; financial state-
ments and projections; and provisions governing transactions with
affiliates of the sponsor. Such detailed disclosure documents should
provide even the unsophisticated investor with the materials necessary
to make an informed investment decision, 9' and should substantially
ment fees on improved properties tend to absorb a substantial portion of the cash
return. Third, high leverage (mortgage financing) increases the risks, for in the event
net cash flow is insufficient to service the debt, the partnership's equity may be re-
duced or eliminated through foreclosure. This would result in a taxable gain without
surplus cash where the liquidated mortgage balance exceeds the tax basis. The aver-
age taxpayer is generally ill-prepared to pay taxes on gain which is not coexistent
with cash flow. Finally, the risks which point to a need to assure investor suitability
also include the fact that real estate is not readily marketable and is subject to ad-
verse economic changes. See Prospectus for American Housing Partners (Aug. 3 1.
1971). in I NOTABLE SYNDICArIONS 5 (S. Roulac ed. 1972).
88. WASH. AD. CODE § 460-32A-195 (1975). This section closely parallels pro-
visions of the Midwest Guidelines, supra note 76, at Part VII -C.
89. Risk factors may include an outline and warning of: initial financing, partner-
ship dependency upon management and upon unpredictable factors, factors beyond
the partnership's control, present and potential conflicts of interest, the high degree
of competition, leverage investments and the increased risk of loss, limited transfer-
ability of units. compensation of management, conditional tax status and minimal
reserves for operating expenses. Prospectus for Atlanta Area Apartment Program
(Oct. 8, 1971), in I NOTABLE SYNDICATIONS 43 (S. Roulac ed. 1972).
90. It would appear that a statement of investment objectives and policies is par-
ticularly important to the investor in nonspecified, "blind pool" programs. For a
definition of such programs. see note II supra. WASH. AD. CODE § 460-32A-235
(1975) makes express provisions for nonspecified property programs requiring a
statement of the types of properties in which it proposes to invest, "such as first-user
apartment projects, subsequent-user apartment projects, shopping centers, office build-
ings, unimproved land, etc." Such requirements have been the subject of some criti-
cism. The question arises whether the information regarding the properties the part-
nership intends to purchase is essential to the individual's decision whether to invest
in a particular partnership. In comparison, newly formed mutual funds do not dis-
close that they intend to invest a given percentage of their portfolio in a particular
stock. The criticism is that it is arbitrary to single out partnerships for such treat-
ment. See Augustine, Public Real Estate Limited Partnership-An Introduction, in
D. AUGUSTINE & R. LOWELL, REAL ESTATE SYNDICATIONS I 1 (1972).
91. Practically, even the unsophisticated investor should be able to draw the ap-
propriate conclusions from disclosure that general partner has never managed the
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decrease the likelihood that oral or "course of dealings" modifications
will be found to alter the scheme from that which was originally con-
templated.
C. Transactions Between the Members: Curbing Self-dealing
In an effort to stem general partner self-dealing, particularly with
regard to general partner compensation and indirect profit or advan-
tage from transactions with its affiliates or subsidiaries, the Wash-
ington Rules adopt much of the detailed regulation of the Midwest
Guidelines.9 2 They provide that the total consideration of all kinds
paid directly or indirectly to the general partner or its affiliates shall
be reasonable.93 The handling by the general partner of any funds and
assets of the partnership subjects the general partner to a fiduciary
duty, regardless of whether the funds are in its immediate posses-
sion.94
1. General partner compensation
The Washington Rules approve and limit three basic types of com-
pensation: acquisition fees, management fees and promotional inter-
ests. An acquisition fee95 is payable only for services actually rendered
to the partnership and general partners shall not receive real estate
particular real estate involved, or that its past real estate limited partnerships are
now insolvent.
92. Midwest Guidelines, sjipra note 76, at Part IV.
93. WASH. AD. CODE § 460-32-020 (1972), as revised § 460-32A-020 (1975).
Unhelpfully, what constitutes "reasonable" fees, compensation and expenses is to be
determined by considering all aspects of the program, including: organization and
offering expenses, compensation for acquisition services, compensation for develop-
ment and/or construction services, compensation for program management, and addi-
tional compensation to the sponsor in the form of subordinated interest and promo-
tional interests. This section has very little informational or regulatory value beyond
requiring that all such compensation to be paid by the partnership be disclosed in the
prospectus in tabular form, specifying how and when it will be paid. The actual regu-
latory feature is found in the 18%-of-gross-proceeds limit on all compensation 'paid
to everyone invblved in the program. See id. § 460-32A-025.
94. Id. § 460-32A-205.
95. Id. § 460-IOA-055 provides:
ACQUISITION FEE. The total of all fees and commissions paid by any party
in connection with the purchase, construction, or development of property by a
program. Included in the computation of such fees or commissions shall be any
real estate commission, acquisition fee, selection fee, development fee, construc-
tion fee, non-recurring management fee, or any fee of a similar nature, how-
ever designated.
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commissions, finder's fees or similar fees from anyone other than the
partnership. 96 All such fees are subject to an upper limit of 18 percent
of the gross proceeds of the offering. 97 A ceiling of one percent of the
cost of real property is placed upon the general partner's program
management fee.98 The promotional interest (partnership share) of the
general partner is now subordinated to the return of the limited part-
ners' capital contribution.9
2. Spread between general partner cost and price to the partnership
A crucial aspect of general partner compensation, previously sub-
ject to substantial abuse as illustrated by the facts of Bassan, is that of
general partner profits on sales of real estate to the limited partner-
ship. Under the former Washington Rules, the general partner was
permitted to sell real estate to the limited partnership at its fair market
value based on "independent appraisals. °"100 Of course, the inexacti-
tude of most real estate appraisals101 left the way open for abuse. For
96. Id. § 460-32A-025. This section appears directed at amounts paid by owners
of real estate to the general partner to induce the general partner to acquire the real
property for resale to the partnership.
97. Id. § 460-32A-025(2). As the definition quoted in note 95 supra indicates.
the 18% limit applies to fees (or profits) for both pre- and post-formation acqui-
sitions of property by the general partner. Compare WASH. AD. CODE § 460-32A-
045 (1975), prohibiting post-formation sale of property to the partnership at a price
"greater than the cost of such property to the sponsor," and allowing sale at forma-
tion for a price greater than cost only where "some material change has occurred to
the property which would increase the value since the [general partner] acquired the
property." See notes 106-07 and accompanying text infra.
98. WASH. AD. CODE § 460-32A-030 (1975). The "cost of property" is defined in
§ 460-1 OA-100 as:
The sum of the price paid by the buyer for property plus all costs, payments,
and expenses and costs of improvements, if any, reasonably and properly allo-
cable to the property in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles
(cost may include acquisition fees, loan "points," prepaid interest, and debts).
Section 460-32A-030 should be read in conjunction with § 460-32A-045 such that
the "cost" referred to in the former is the cost to the partnership. If, in fact, this
is the manner in which a general partner's program management fee is to be set, the
limitations on cost in transactions between the general partner and limited part-
nership set forth in § 460-32A-045 (see notes 106-07 infra) should be rigidly ap--
plied. This is necessary to prevent abuse in setting the cost basis for general partner
management fees.
99. Id. § 460-32A-035. The objective is to insure a return of the limited part-
ner's investment before the general partner begins to profit, thereby avoiding potential
self-dealing whereby the general partner "milks" the partnership of its profits.
100. WASH. AD. CODE § 460-32-100 (1972).
101. See Comment, supra note 32, at 143 n.28, in which the author notes: "Peo-
ple unfamiliar with real estate appraisal often make the fallacious assumption that
the determination of value by an appraiser is precise and accurate and is determined
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example, in the Murakami transaction in Bassan, one report indicated
that the fair market value of the property was $688,000 on the date it
was acquired by the partnership, based upon an estimated value of the
future retail value of its component parts.102 Another report valued
the property at $325,000 on the same date, based upon the present
value of the parcels on a bulk basis. 103
The new Washington Rules deemphasize the use of appraisals and
the concept of fair market value with respect to sales of real estate to
the partnership. 04 They now proscribe the sale or lease to the part-
nership of:105
property in which a [general partner] has an interest unless: (a) The
transaction occurs at the formation of the [partnership], and is fully
disclosed in its prospectus or offering circular, and (b) The property is
sold upon terms fair to the [partnership] and at a price not in excess
of its appraised value ....
Most importantly, the Washington Rules call for an examination of
the fairness and reasonableness of the property valuation: If the gen-
eral partner's cost is less than the price offered to the limited partners,
there will be a presumption of unfairness, rebuttable by a showing
that "some material change has occurred to the property which would
increase the value since the [general partner] acquired the prop-
erty."'106 As for post-formation transactions, the rule is absolute:
by 'scientific' methods. This is simply not so." The author cites the evaluation of
numerous factors involved in the appraisal process discussed in S. KAHN, F. CASE & A.
SCHIMMEL, REAL ESTATE APPRAISAL AND INVESTMENT 12 (1963), including economic,
sociological, political and geographic variables. The inequities often involved in an
appraisal are illustrated in a taxation case, Northwest Chemurgy Sec. Co. v. Chelan
County, 38 Wn. 2d 87, 228 P.2d 129 (1951), where appraisals of the same real es-
tate by expert witnesses as well as the tax assessor ranged from $30,000 to $110,800
over a two year period, despite the fact that there were no substantial changes in the
improvements or the surroundings during that period. See also text accompanying
notes 102-03 infra.
102. Brief for Appellants at 13, Bassan.
103. Id. at 14.
104. Appraisals have been retained to a limited extent by specifying that the
general partner may be required to keep an appraisal on file for five years (presumably
from the date of acquisition by the general partner although this is unstated in the
statute). WASH. AD. CODE § 460-32A-105 (1975).
105. Id. § 460-32A-045.
106. Id. § 460-32A-045(l)(c). The section states further:
Material factors may include the passage of a significant amount of time (but in
no event less than 2 years), the assumption by the promoter of the risk of ob-
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The property may be purchased by the limited partnership at "a price
no greater than the cost of such property to the [general partner] ."o7
3. Miscellaneous transactions
Expenses of the partnership are to be billed directly to the partner-
ship and in no event will reimbursement be paid to an affiliate or the
promoter.1 08 This avoids the problems raised when, as in Bassan, a
general partner's profits are challenged and the general partner re-
sponds that it was merely attempting to cover its operating expenses.
Expenses of the partnership paid to a nonaffiliated third party are pre-
sumptively bona fide. t09
The Washington Rules expressly forbid reciprocal business ar-
rangements which would violate any of the other provisions.110 They
forbid both commingling of funds with any other "person' l and in-
vestments in other programs.112 These provisions are aimed at the
potential for abuse of "interlocking directorates," often authorized by
articles of limited partnership, in which an individual or corporation
is the general partner of numerous limited partnerships and proceeds
to transact business among the limited partnerships.' 13
taining a re-zoning of the property and its subsequent re-zoning, or some other
extraordinary event which in fact increases the value of the property.
Compare Midwest Guidelines. supra note 76. at Part III-A-2. Presumably. if
the general partner sells the real estate to the partnership at a price in excess of its
cost and is unable to show appreciation in value, the difference will be held in con-
structive trust for the benefit of the partnership. See Parts I-B & C supra.
107. WASH. AD. CODE § 460-32A-045(l)(d) (1975). This is a codification of the
business opportunity doctrine. See text accompanying note 74 supra. In related
transactions, the partnership may not acquire property in exchange for partnership
interests. WASH. AD. CODE § 460-32A-050 (1975). On ultimate sales, the general
partner will not be granted the exclusive right to sell for the partnership. Id. §
460-32A-055.
108. WASH. AD. CODE § 460-32A--080 (1975).
109. Id. § 460-32A-03 1. This section would apply, for example, where the gener-
al partner hires an independent third-party manager for partnership rental properties
or utilizes an independent real estate broker for sales of partnership property.
110. Id. § 460-32A-070.
11l. Id. § 460-32A-075. "Person" is defined as "any natural person, partnership.
corporation, association or other legal entity." Id. § 460-10-130.
112. Id. § 460-32A-085.
113. This type of self-dealing by a general partner is now expressly prohibited
by WASH. AD. CODE § 460-32A-045(4) (1975). which precludes a partnership
from acquiring "property from a [partnership] in which the [general partner] has
an interest." The regulation does not, however, preclude a general partner from act-
ing as such in more than one limited partnership.
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D. Rights of Limited Partners: A Limited Form of "Control"
In conjunction with the 1972 amendments to Section 7 of the
WULPA, 114 the new Washington Rules identify the rights of the lim-
ited partners to: call meetings of the limited partnership; 115 remove a
general partner for cause;"16 dissolve the partnership;" 7 ahd approve
or reject outsider replacement of the general partner. 1 8 In addition,
the general partner must prepare and submit periodic reports 1 9 as
well as provide the limited partners with reasonable access to the part-
nership's records. 2 0 None of these rights evidence "control" of the
partnership, since they are specifically excepted by statute from the
definition of control,' 2 ' and since no creditor would be induced by
this organizational scheme to rely upon the limited partner's personal
assets. 12
2
E. Nonspecified Property Offerings: "Blind Pools"
Due to the higher risks to the investor generally involved in a pro-
posal to acquire certain types of property in the future, "blind pool"
offerings require special regulations. 123 The new Washington Rules
114. See note 46 supra.
115. WASH. AD. CODE § 460-32A-145 (1975).
116. Id. § 460-32A-150.
117. Id.
118. Id. § 460-32A-155.
119. Id. § 460-32A-160.
120. Id. § 460-32A-165.
121. See WULPA § 7, WASH. REV. CODE § 25.08.070 (1974), quoted, note 46
supra.
122. See Feld, The "Control" Test for Limited Partnerships, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1471, 1478 (1969) (" [t]he limited partner would not be generally liable so long as
he does not do anything which would affect the partnership's relations to third parties
...."). See generally Comment, "Control" in the Limited Partnership, 7 JOHN MAR-
SHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 416, 422 (1974).
123. California disfavors "blind pool" property offerings but they are not pro-
hibited. Hrusoff & Cazares, Formation of the Public Limited Partnership, 22 HAST.
LJ. 87, 111-12 (1970), citing H. MARSH & R. VOLK, PRACTICE UNDER THE CALI-
FORNIA CORPORATE SECURITIES LAW OF 1968, at 318 (1969), in which Marsh and Volk
point out:
The Commissioner normally will not authorize the offer and sale of limited
partnership interests in a "blind pool" where there is no specific property to be
acquired by the real estate syndicate and the formulation of the syndicate
is solely for the purpose of raising funds to acquire unspecified property at some
time in the future.
New York has specifically prohibited such offerings. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e
(McKinney Supp. 1974). The disfavor of "blind pool" offerings stems from the
risks inherent in investing in a program without being able to evaluate the profit po-
tential of underlying assets. See Comment, supra note 32, at 142-44.
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make some progress toward regulating such offerings by requiring a
statement of investment objectives,12 4 limiting the types of property
which may be acquired,12 5 limiting the offering period,' 26 and re-
quiring a special report to the investors on at least a quarterly basis. 127
However, the Washington Rules stop far short of fully compensating
for the higher risk involved in blind pool offerings and of providing
the additional measure of investor protection required. By contrast,
the Midwest Guidelines suggest that: "blind pool" enterprises be sub-
ject to a minimum capitalization of $1,000,000;128 the sponsor
must have had at least five years experience in the real estate business
in an executive capacity and two years in the management and acqui-
sition of property of the types to be acquired;12 9 and the minimum in-
vestment for higher-risk offerings would be applied.1 30 While the
Washington Rules now differentiate between specified and nonspeci-
fled property offerings,131 the revisers apparently did not fully antici-
pate the potential for abuse in the context of accumulating investors'
funds for discretionary investment purposes.132
V. CONCLUSION
It is not enough to label the general partner in a real estate limited
partnership a "fiduciary" and presume its responsibilities are thereby
clearly defined. There are three primary elements of the general part-
ner's fiduciary duties: First, that the general partner's obligation to
124. See note 90 and accompanying text supra.
125. Id.
126. WASH. AD. CODE § 460-32A-240 (1975) (one year from date of effective-
ness of the offering).
127. Id. § 460-32A-245.
128. Midwest Guidelines, supra note 76, at Part VI-A.
129. Id. Part VI-B. See also id. at Part 111-B--1.
130. Id. Part Il-D sets a minimum investment for high and low risk offerings.
and it is presumed, by inference from the anticipated higher risks of nonspecified
property offerings expressly provided for in Part VI, that the higher risk figure of
$5,000 should be applied. There is, however, no definite correlation between a higher
price and investor sophistication. See note 86 supra. For example, in Bassanl inves-
tors paid $10.000 per limited partnership unit despite the unsophisticated nature of
the offering. See note 9 supra.
131. WASH. AD. CODE § 460-32A-225 (1975).
132. But see id. § 460-32A-045(d). Although this section is not within the
provisions pertaining strictly to nonspecified property offerings, because it limits the
general partner to a price equal to its original acquisition cost on post-formation ac-
quisitions and sales to the partnership, it must be applicable in the "blind pool" con-
text. This section may, depending upon its application, provide the protection neces-
sary in a "blind pool" offering.
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the limited partnership commences well before its formation, at the
prospective stage; second, as Bassan establishes, that the general part-
ner is bound by its representations made to the limited partners in its
prospectus and all partnership agreements such that a right or interest
not expressly given to the general partner in the agreement will be
denied upon formation; third, that the general partner's profits are subor-
dinate to the interest of the limited partnership, and if the specific profit
is not disclosed and coexistent with advancing the partnership enter-
prise it will be disallowed.
These three elements are present in the new Washington Rules for
Real Estate Limited Partnerships. The Rules also encompass the Wash-
ington court's suggestion in Bassan that full and complete disclosure
of all elements of general partner profits may be inadequate. Disclo-
sure is the hallmark of the new Washington Rules, with the added
dimension of limits beyond which general partner profits and transac-
tions will be presumed unfair to the partnership. It is suggested that
the courts may find it useful to examine challenged general partner
abuses under the fairness inquiry of the common law arm's length
bargain and business opportunity doctrines as well as the presump-
tions provided by the new Washington Rules. These tools recognize
the appeal real estate limited partnership investments have to the un-
sophisticated investor who requires substantially greater protection
than is provided by basic contract rules or full and complete disclosure
principles.
Linda Kelley Ebberson
1005
